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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this case, we reconsider a petition for review which 
was first filed on May 12, 1995, by Eleazar Jose Morel, a 
native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) asks us to set 
aside our original opinion in this case in which we granted 
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Morel's petition challenging the Board of Immigration 
Appeals' (BIA) construction of S 212(c) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c). See Morel v. 
INS, 90 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1996). The INS now argues that 
the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), applies 
here to foreclose our ability to entertain this petition and 
grant the relief Morel requests. Because we agree, we now 
vacate our original opinion. Consequently, the decision of 
the BIA affirming the immigration judge's denial of the 
applicability of S 212(c) to Morel from which appeal was 
taken to this Court, is final. 
 
Although the limited factual record has already been set 
out in our previous opinion, we nonetheless provide a 
detailed procedural history because of the significance of 
the timing of the events leading up to this rehearing. These 
events were set in motion when Morel was arrested in New 
Jersey on August 24, 1991, and charged with possession of 
a controlled dangerous substance and possession of a 
controlled dangerous substance within 1000 feet of a 
school. On January 6, 1993, Morel was sentenced to four 
years in a New Jersey correctional facility, after pleading 
guilty to the first possession charge.1  
 
While serving his sentence, Morel was served with an 
Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing by the INS. 
Upon completion of his sentence and his transfer to an INS 
detention facility in Oakdale, Louisiana, Morel was provided 
a hearing before an immigration judge. At the hearing held 
on January 17, 1994, Morel conceded that he had been 
convicted of a deportable offense, but sought discretionary 
relief pursuant to INA S 212(c). The immigration judge 
denied Morel's request, finding that he had accumulated 
insufficient residency to be eligible for discretionary relief 
and ordered him deported to the Dominican Republic. On 
April 10, 1995, the BIA affirmed the order and dismissed 
Morel's appeal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The charge of possession of a controlled dangerous substance within 
a 1000 feet of a school was dismissed, ostensibly as part of a plea 
agreement. 
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On May 12, 1995, Morel filed a petition for review in this 
Court. We ordered argument of the case on March 25, 
1996. On July 26, 1996, a majority of this panel issued an 
opinion in which we concluded that the INS had erred in 
construing INA S 212(c) to impose a requirement of seven 
consecutive years domicile after he was admitted to the 
United States as a lawful permanent resident and in 
interpreting S 212(c) not to allow for the crediting of Morel's 
accumulated residency for the time that his mother 
proceeded him in the United States.2 Morel, 90 F.3d at 834. 
 
We remanded Morel's case to the BIA for further 
proceedings. However, prior to any further action being 
taken before the agency, the INS submitted a Petition for 
Panel Rehearing in which the agency contended that 
AEDPA's passage on April 24, 1996, had divested us of 
jurisdiction to entertain Morel's petition for review. We 
ordered additional briefing and granted reargument to 
address this serious jurisdictional concern. 
 
We agree that AEDPA divests this Court of jurisdiction.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Judge Greenberg filed a dissenting opinion. See Morel, 90 F.3d at 
842-46. 
 
3. Although the enactment of AEDPA pre-dated thefiling of our original 
opinion on July 26, 1996, the INS did not alert us to the possible defect 
in our jurisdiction until September 9, 1996. The government now 
candidly confesses that the failure to raise the issue sooner was an 
oversight on its part. 
 
This case is unusually postured in that no jurisdictional challenge was 
advanced until after our merits opinion was filed. There is, however, no 
suggestion that we should not examine our jurisdiction for this reason. 
Indeed, we are obliged to investigate into our competence to hear a case 
regardless of the action or inaction of the parties: 
 
       [N]o action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction 
upon 
       a federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant, 
       principles of estoppel do not apply, and a party does not waive the 
       requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the 
       proceedings. . . . [A] court, including an appellate court, will 
raise 
       lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion. "[T]he rule, 
       springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the 
       United States is inflexible and without exception, which requires 
       this court, of its own motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in 
the 
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In the case of aliens convicted of certain criminal offenses, 
AEDPA S 440(a) removes from us jurisdiction to review a 
claim of legal error in deportation proceedings.4 Morel does 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       exercise of its appellate power, that of all other courts of the 
United 
       States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively 
       appear in the record." 
 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 
111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (citations omitted)). 
 
This obligation applies with equal force to claims that we are without 
jurisdiction because the action has become moot. North Carolina v. Rice, 
404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) ("the question of mootness is one . . . which 
a federal court must resolve before it assumes jurisdiction"); Lusardi v. 
Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Article III requires that 
a plaintiff's claim be live not just when he first brings the suit but 
throughout the entire litigation, and once the controversy ceases to exist 
the court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction."). 
 
Thus, in keeping with these precepts, the past practice of this Court 
and others has been to entertain jurisdictional challenges even when not 
advanced until a petition for rehearing is filed. See In re Texas E. 
Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 
1230, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994) (addressing jurisdictional issues not raised 
until petition for panel rehearing); see also Franchise Tax Bd. of the 
State 
of Calif. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Calif., 463 U.S. 
1, 
7 (1983) (same); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 
572, 579-80 (1980) (same); Goodwin v. United States, 602 F.2d 107, 
108-110 (6th Cir. 1979) (addressing and refuting challenge to subject 
matter jurisdiction in decision refusing to grant petition for panel 
rehearing); Kelly v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 400, 
409 (5th Cir. 1961) (same). We therefore do not hesitate to take on this 
issue here. 
 
4. AEDPA S 440(a) amends INA S 106(a), 8 U.S.C. S 1105a(a), which 
formerly designated the Courts of Appeals as the exclusive fora for 
"judicial review of all final orders of deportation" except to the extent 
that 
limited additional judicial review was available via habeas corpus 
proceedings, see INA S 106(a)(10). AEDPA S 440(a) supplants existing 
paragraph (10) of Subsection (a) of INA S 106(a) with the following 
language: 
 
       Any final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable 
by 
       reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 
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not dispute that he was convicted of a deportable criminal 
offense covered in INA S 241(a)(2)(B)(I), 8 U.S.C. 
S 1251(a)(2)(B)(I). Thus, we conclude that AEDPA S 440(a) 
denies Morel the right to obtain review by an Article III court.5 
The subsequent adoption by Congress of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA), Div. C of Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 
(1996) on September 30, 1996, further restructuring the 
deportation process, does not affect the outcome of this 
case. 
 
Furthermore, although Morel asserts to the contrary, we 
do not see any deprivation of his rights which is of 
constitutional proportion. The INS concedes that S 440(a) 
does not preclude Article III court review of claims of 
"substantial Constitutional error." Resp. Supp. Br. at 20. 
Morel's claim here is not such a claim -- he has sought 
review of a question of law as we set out in our prior 
opinion, see Morel v. INS, 90 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1996), that 
is, whether in construing S 212(c)'s requirement of seven 
consecutive years domicile after one is admitted to the 
United States as a lawful permanent resident, one can get 
credit for the accumulated residency of one's parent who 
preceeded one in the United States. Additionally, relevant 
Supreme Court authority does not mandate judicial review 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       1251(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title, or any offense 
covered by 
       section 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) of this title for which both predicate 
offenses 
       are covered by section 1251(a)(2)(A)(I) of this title, shall not be 
       subject to review by any court. 
 
AEDPA S 440(a). The pre-AEDPA INA S 106(a)(10) was repealed by AEDPA 
S 401(e). 
 
5. The question of whether AEDPA S 440(a) applies retroactively has 
already been settled in this Circuit. In Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309 
(3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1842 (1997) a panel of this Court 
held that AEDPA S 440(a)'s amendment of INAS 106(a)(10) applies to 
petitions for review pending when AEDPA was enacted even though 
Congress included no effective date in the Act. We reasoned that no 
barrier exists to the application of AEDPA S 440(a) because "unlike 
situations where retroactivity would affect pre-existing rights, 
withdrawal 
of jurisdiction, although realistically disrupting settled expectations, 
does 
not preserve pending litigation." Id. at 311. 
 
                                6 
  
by an Article III court of questions of law underlying 
legislatively-created public rights such as immigration. See 
Crowell v. Benson, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932) (drawing a 
distinction between public and private rights and listing 
immigration as an exemplar of a public right); see also 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982); Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986). 
 
To conclude, because Congress has divested us of 
jurisdiction to review matters falling within the purview of 
AEDPA S 440(a), we will vacate our prior opinion in this 
matter, see Morel v. INS, 90 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1996), and 
we will deny the petition for review. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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